What is the 'seat of consciousness' in Buddhism? This is the question that this essay seeks to answer, understanding the term 'seat', however, as a mere 'concealing'1 (sammuti) term, to denote not a static entity but a dynamic process, like every other dhamma 'phenomenon'2-human, animal, plant, or otherwise. In answering the question, we shall explore three sources: the Nikayas, the Abhidhamma, and the works of two commentators, Buddhaghosa's Vissuddhimagga (fifth century c.E.) and Kassapa's MohavicchedanT (twelfth century c.E.). While the former is the "oldest non-canonical authority of the Theravada" (Nanamoli 1956, p. x), the latter represents "the final stage of development of the Theravada Abhidhamma system in India and Ceylon" (Buddhadatta and Warder 1961, p. xv). No attempt, however, has been made here to explore traditions other than the Theravada.
tradition itself, by actually listing citta as one of thirty-nine dhammas in the 'mentality domain' (cittuppadakando) (Buddhadatta and Warder, p. 8), equating it with viffnnana and manas. It is now given a description as in the case of hadayavattu, the characteristic being shown as 'knowing' (vijanana), the function as 'forerunning' (pubbargama), the manifestation as 'continuous existence in consciousness' (nirantarappavattito santana), and, unlike in relation to hadayavatthu, the proximate cause as 'mentality-materiality' (namarQpa) (ibid., p. 12). It is as if Kassapa saw a hiatus in Buddhaghosa's systematization and felt compelled to fill it! Judging by the Visuddhimagga and the Mohavicchedani, then, what we find in the commentaries is that the mind, using the term citta in particular, is associated, firmly and irrevocably, with the heart.5
The Abhidhamma. In his notes to hadayavatthu, in editing Abhidhammatthasangaha (see note 5), contemporary Sri Lankan scholar Narada (1968, p. 293) says that "the Buddha refers to the basis of consciousness in such indirect terms as yam rupam nissaya 'depending on that material thing'," a point made by Aung (1910) and Nlanamoli (pp. 498, 502) as well. But Narada's quotation, though attributed to the Buddha, is in fact, not from the Nikayas but from the Abhidhamma work, Patthana (Mrs. Davids 1921), a later systematization. It is said, for example, that the mind-element and the mind-consciousness element sometimes occur as a 'prenascence condition' (as, e.g., in the course of an existence) and sometimes do not (as, e.g., at rebirth linking).6 And in the explanation of a 'prenascence condition', the 'heart basis' (hadayavatthu) is listed as one of eleven physical conditions (along with the five physical bases of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body and objects in the five doors) for the mind-element and mind-consciousness element and for the states associated with it.
Interestingly, however, hadayavatthu does not occur in the DhammasarganT, the first book of Abhidhamma (nor does it occur in Atthasalini, Buddhaghosa's commentary to it). What does occur is hadaya, which, unlike in the Patthana, is equated with the mind. Here hadaya 'heart' is equated with, among other things, the three major terms for the mind (supra), citta, mano, and vifinnana. As if further evidence were needed, we find the same stock answer repeated for the same question again, replacing vi.nnana with manayatana and manovifnfnanadhatu (ibid.). In like manner, we find in the Vibhanga that hadaya Suwanda H.J. Sugunasiri is defined "in a purely mental and not physical sense" (Nanamoli, p. 498 n. 26), in its definition of mind-element and mind-consciousness element.7
Like the Commentaries, then, we find the Abhidhamma making a definite link of the mind with the heart, even though not all the Abhidhamma authors seem to have been sure whether to put it in the mentality domain or the materiality domain, or whether to use hadaya or hadayavatthu! The Nikayas. Since both the Abhidhamma and the Commentaries always quote the Nikayas as their source and authority, we need to look at what evidence we get from the Nikayas for a link between the mind and the heart. The first of the two dictionary entries quoted in the subsection above gives its source as Samyutta 1.199. In examining this source, we find the Buddha's chief disciple Ananda being addressed by "a deva, indigenous to that [Kosalese] ' Having gone forth to the thicket at the foot of a tree, and having experienced nibbana in the heart....'8 Given that none of the classical cognates for the mind (e.g., citta, mano, or vinfnina) appears in the verse, the association of the mind with the heart can only be made here by extension, understanding that the experiencing of nibbana is through the mind, or, put another way, that it is the mind that experiences nibbana. So it is only through a great license as taken by Mrs. Davids (see note 8) that we can agree with the Dictionary entry, "the heart as the seat of thought and feeling."
Elsewhere in the Samyutta, there occurs a line where both citta and hadaya occur: cittam va khipeyya hadayam va phaleyya ... 'derange the mind or split the heart' (Samyutta 1.207). While the two clearly have nothing to do with each other here, their occurrence together may be interpreted as suggesting an implicit connection. Even in such an event, the words are not the Buddha's, even though the utterance falls off his lips; he is only repeating the words of Suciloma, the Yakkha, who has threatend him: "Friar, I will ask thee a question. If thou answerest me not, I will either derange thy mind or split thy heart" (Mrs. Davids 1950, p. 265 ).9 The words that follow, "I will take you by the feet and throw thee over the Ganges," clearly indicate that Suciloma was speaking literally, and in no fancy language.10 A similar association between the mind and the heart is contained So it is not the Buddha that is speaking! As can be seen, then, the only three references in the Samyutta that seem to suggest an association between the mind and the heart are contained in the "Sagatha" section, dealing as they do "with legends, fairies, gods and devils, with royal and priestly interviewers of the sublime teacher" (ibid., p. vi), or of his disciples. So the only evidence we have from the Samyutta comes not through the words of the Buddha but from unenlightened puthujjanas 'average people', or rather puthussattas 'average beings'-to coin a term that includes humans, yakkhas, and devas! What the Nikayas then encourage us to conclude is that whatever else the Buddha may or may not have understood as the seat of consciousness (see discussion below), it certainly wasn't the heart. In fact, the only sense in which the term hadaya occurs in the Nikayas is in the sense of an organ, as, for example, the eleventh part of the body in a list of thirty-two upon which to meditate12-this in the Patisambhidamagga (Taylor 1905, vol . 1, p. 6), a book of the Khuddaka Nikaya.13 The term hadayavatthu, which appears in the Abhidhamma and the Commentarial literature with roughly the same semantic distribution as hadaya, never once appears in the Nikayas! Discussion. Given that the Buddha himself has not linked the mind to the heart, or at least not made a statement to that effect, what is readily evident is that the localization of the mind in the heart seems to have taken root among the ranks of the Buddha's discipleship during the time of the systematization of the Abhidhamma. But during this stage, the conceptualization still seems fluid: sometimes not appearing at all, as, for example, in the Dhammasarganl, where it appears sometimes as hadaya alone, sometimes as hadayavatthu, and sometimes with one or the other appearing in either of or both the material and the mentality domains. The fact that the term does not appear in the AtthasalinT, Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Dhammasargan, in which he sought to be authentic to tradition, provides further evidence of the ambivalence during this early period.
Since, however, we find such fluidity giving way to solidity by Buddhaghosa's time (fifth century C.E.), it may encourage one to view the entrenchment as a result of a boldness on the part of Buddhaghosa, given Suwanda If Buddhaghosa is thus being authentic to tradition, it can be reasonably assumed that the notion of hadayavatthu as the seat of consciousness was already in the Sinhalese commentaries as well (in addition to the Abhidhamma). Since the Visuddhimagga was the "test" by which Buddhaghosa was judged by the Sinhalese Elders to be allowed to translate the commentaries into Pali, it cannot but be the case that he had to be accurate in his understanding and analysis of so central a concept as the dhammas. It is indeed entirely possible as well that Buddhaghosa noted the presence of the noncanonical material in the Sinhalese commentaries, but, as Adikaram points out (p. 4), his task was "not to rectify," particularly given his lack of originality (supra) and the striving for authenticity to scripture. There are, of course, unfortunately no Sinhalese commentaries to check out this claim.
So if we assume a role for Buddhaghosa, the authors of Sinhalese commentaries, and the authors of the Abhidhamma in the evolving Philosophy East & West localization of the mind in the heart, they all seemed to have had a fur- The apparent semantic inconsistency of the three major terms seems to complicate matters further. If, as we have seen in the Samyutta and the DTgha statements above, that the terms are used synonymously, they are also used with different shades of meaning. "Mano represents the intellectual functioning of consciousness, while viniifna represents the field of sense and sense-reaction ('perception'), and citta the subjective aspect of consciousness" (Davids and Stede, p. 520). Or "In mano we have the man valuing, measuring, appraising, and also purposing, intending.... In citta, we more usually have the man as affective and affected, as experiencing. In vinnana, we have the man as not of this world only" (Mrs. Rhys Davids 1936, p. 237).
Philosophy East & West
Further, while citta means "inquisitiveness, instability, impulsiveness" (combining the intellectual and the affective), or "thinking or thought" (intellectual), it is on the one hand contrasted with kaya 'body' (as, e.g., in the series, cakkhu, sota, ghana, jivha, kaya, and mano), and on the other hand with rOpa 'matter' (ibid., p. 239). It is also both compared and contrasted with 'will' (Davids and Stede, p. 267). Mano is, again, used with "prefixes of sentiment," as, for example, in sumana and dummana (ibid., p. 238), but not citta.
Given the sometimes overlapping, sometimes complementary usage, it now seems a simple step for Buddhaghosa, the Sinhalese commentators, or the Abhidhammikas to extend the association of nibbana to the heart in the Samyutta (supra), made by a deva, first, to all three terms, citta, mano, and vi~nana, and second, to put it in the mouth of the Buddha! Not even the fact that the connection was being made in the other two contexts in the Samyutta by a yakkha and Mara's daughters seems to have entered anybody's mind!19
If, then, inconsistency in the Nikayas served as one condition for the view to prevail that the mind was located in the heart, it is equally likely that the notion was influenced by an external source as well: the Upanisads. For one thing, at least some of the Upanisads (other than the earliest five)20 were not much older in time, some in fact being written afterwards.21 For another, at least some of the Sinhalese elders who wrote down the first Commentaries, if not Buddhaghosa himself,22 were "conversant with the Sanskrit language" (Adikaram, p. 4). 23 What, then, is this Upanisadic view? The Sanskrit term jTva(h), which means 'life' (Monier-Williams 1957, p. 452), literally means 'that which breathes', from the root jiv 'to breathe'. According to the Brhad-aranyaka Upanisad, the atman 'soul' is based on the prana 'life-breath', also called 'in-breath' (Radhakrishnan 1953) .24 Death, too, is associated with breathing, in both the physical and the nonphysical senses.25
If breath is associated with 'soul' and 'death' in the Upanisads, we also find it associated with the heart as well, in life and at death. In sleep, for example, "When this being fell asleep ... then [he] rests in that place which is the space within the heart" (yatraisa etat supto'bhOt ... ya eso'ntar-hrdaya akaisah tasmin chete) (BU 11.1.17; R, p. 189). At death, "the point of his heart becomes lighted up and by that light the self departs" (tasya haitasya hrdayasyagram pradyotate, tena pradyotenaisa atma niskramati) (BU IV.4.2; R, p. 270).
Nor is that all. jTva, which, as we have seen, referred originally to the biological aspect of human nature throughout one's life (awake, in a dream state, or asleep), has a cognate, purusa, meaning 'man' (both gender-neutral and male). But the term has a literal sense as well, namely puri-saya 'that which dwells in the citadel of heart' (R, p. 90). In the Katha Upanisad of several centuries later, we in fact find the soul (or self) directly linked with the heart: atmasya jantor nihito guhayam 'the self is set in the heart of every creature' (KU But what about the heart as the seat of the 'mind'? For this we have to turn to the Chandogya Upanisad, where we find a specific reference to two cognates of the mind, mano and citta, captured in the parallel phrases mano brahmeti 'mind as Brahman' (CU 111.18.1; R, p. 397) and cittam brahmeti 'thought as Brahman' (CU VII.5.3; R, pp. 474-475).
So we find in the Upanisads, both early and late, the mind associated with the heart, definitively and irrevocably. But how is the heart itself described in terms of its physical make It may now be instructive to recall that the heart was characterized in the Visuddhimagga (see above), too, in terms of a lotus, in relation to both its shape and color. And, reminiscent of akasa in the Upanisads, Buddhaghosa writes, "Inside it there is a hollow," too (see note 4).
No doubt the much more detailed characterization of the heart in the Visuddhimagga speaks to the creative genius of Buddhaghosa that tNanamoli (supra) talks about. But the parallel between the specific characterization of the heart in relation to the lotus and the placing of 'the mind-element and the mind-consciousness element' in the blood that is in the hollow of the heart are too close to be dismissed as being merely coincidental or accidental. The inevitable conclusion, then, has to be that the origin of the view of the seat of consciousness as being in the heart is at least partly Upanisadic. Now it may be ironic that the early disciples of the Buddha would Suwanda H.J. Sugunasiri want to accept something from Vedism out of a critique of which Buddhism arose. But, of course, it needs to be remembered that the Buddha himself had continued to use some of the Vedic terminology (e.g., namarupa, viifnnana, manas, citta, etc.; see Mrs. Rhys Davids 1936, chap. 10, for a discussion), though with changed meaning, and had not categorically rejected the mind-heart association as he had, for example, the caste system, or the existence of a soul. There is the possibility, further, that Vedism would have been in the country (Lanka) prior to the advent of Buddhism, making it no alien thought to the educated Sinhalese. So it may be conjectured, in the absence of a better alternative, that the disciples hung on to what was helping to make the intellectual circles at the time. There was, after all, no reason to think that the Brahminical tradition was wrong in everything! On the basis of the discussion above, then, we must conclude that in associating the mind (using whatever term) with the heart-basing one- On a surface level, the answer to both questions has to be in the affirmative, for the issue does not seem to have warranted his attention qua issue.28 We find no elucidation of it in the discourses where one should legitimately expect one, namely in the Mahanidana Sutta (DTgha Nikaya 15), one of two suttas mentioned by name at the First Council (the other being the Mahaparinibbana Sutta) and thus likely to be among the oldest and most reflective of the Buddha's own teachings,29 or in the Mahapadana Sutta (DTgha 14) (see Warder 1970, pp. 107-117 for a discussion).
The absence of a specific answer to our question in the Nikayas is on the one hand understandable, since from the Buddha's point of view, all he was doing was refraining from answering abstract, philosophical, or psychological questions merely for the sake of answering them, and seeking rather to help human beings achieve liberation from samsara. Not that he did not have any complex explanations; but he would offer these only to the extent that they were relevant to the liberative process.
But it is precisely for this reason that the lack of an answer is difficult to understand-because of the singularly important position held by the concept of consciousness in his teachings.
Such an absence may also suggest that the Buddha was specifically seeking to avoid answering a 'wrong' question of the type "What would the hair color of an offspring of a barren woman be?"-knowing fully well that any answer given would be wrong! Thus, for example, talking about a 'seat' could suggest (a) a permanence or tangibility where none exits, or (b) a linear causality that contradicts the reality of relationality (reciprocal, circular, and multicausal) as contained in the paticcasamuppada, a fundamental pillar of his teaching.
Despite the absence of a definitive answer to our question in our terms, I want to argue that the Buddha did indeed identify 'the seat of consciousness' without calling it such, however, and that the evidence is right there in the Nikayas, waiting to be discovered and continuing to appear in the Abhidhamma, the Commentaries from the Visuddhimagga to the MohavicchedanT, and in all the Buddhist writings of all schools to date.
In our explorations for a home for consciousness, we can find the teacher talking to Ananda, explaining to him his teaching of paticcasamuppada 'Conditioned Origination' (Mahanidana Sutta). In explaining the cycle of causation, the Buddha comes to the words vinnanapaccaya namarupam 'conditioned by consciousness is the psychophysique'. Then he summarizes the sequence backwards, namarCpapaccaya vininanam, showing the reciprocal relationship between the two, a point in fact made by Sariputta, too, to a learned Brahmin Kotthita (Samyutta 11.80).
The Buddha continues his explanation to Ananda: "If consciousness did not descend into the mother's womb there would be no formation ('coagulation', sam-murcch) of a sentient body in the mother's womb. Or, if, after descending into the womb, consciousness were to pass away, the sentient body would not be produced for this world" (Warder, p. 110).
Since the Mahanidana Sutta is one of two discourses mentioned by name at the First Council, and the fact that it is also shared by other schools (Warder, p. 108),30 we can assume that this was, if not actually the Buddha's very own thinking, the closest we can get to it.
The Mahapadana Sutta (supra) speaks to the same reciprocal relationship: "this consciousness turns back again from the sentient body. It goes no further. To this extent one may be born, grow old, die and be reborn, namely [to the extent that] consciousness exists through the condition of a sentient body, a sentient body through the condition of consciousness" (ibid., p. 117).
A further addition is significant; it makes conditioned origination Suwanda H. 
S V.204).33 Both also occur in the context of 'depriving' (jTvitam voropeti) or 'destruction' (jivitam upacchindati).
The most fundamental justification for our reconstruction, then, is that unlike hadayavatthu, jTvitindriya is authentic to the tradition, and not a later concoction of the Abhidhammikas or Poranachariyas or Buddhaghosa, even though it certainly received further elucidation at their hands.
Though not understood as we have used them here, what is of interest is that we find the two terms (and concepts) appearing in the Visuddhimagga, too-jTvita as the seventh of twenty seven 'constant states' associated with the first sense-sphere of (profitable) Finally, Buddhaghosa seems to recognize the primacy of the lifefaculty over the heart-basis when he says that the latter "is maintained by life" (ayuna anupaliyamanam) (chap. XIV, no. 60) .
If, then, 'life faculty' (1) is an indriya, (2) has, as is to be expected for an indriya, the primary elements as the 'proximate cause', (3) is a condition for rebirth, (4) is not destitute of power for continuing life, and (5) dissolves at death, it is immediately evident that it is coextensive with the whole psychophysique. This conclusion is further confirmed by its being listed (chap. XIV, no. 1) along with itthindriya 'femininity faculty' and purisindriya 'masculinity faculty', both of which, of course, must be understood as being coextensive with the whole body.
This indeed is what we found the Buddha telling us in the Nikayas: the reciprocal relationship between namarupa and vifnnana (supra). In the lamp/wick analogy above, one is reminded of the characterization of vinff.na in relation to namarupa elsewhere: "A state that, while arising, assists [another state] by making it arise together with itself [as] a conascence condition, as a lamp is for illumination" (no. 77; Nanamoli, p. 614). It is thus that Sariputta talks of the two as reeds supporting each other.
As would be evident from our discussion, then, it can be established, with seeming authority from the Buddha and even the later tradition, that jTvitindriya can lay a more legitimate claim as the 'seat of consciousness' in the materiality domain. This, interestingly enough, was a possibility considered by the author of Visuddhimagga Atthakatha, but passed up in favor of hadayavatthu on the flimsiest of arguments, and without any evidential base! To quote: "And in the case of the life faculty, that would have to have another function, so to make it the support would be illogical, too" (Nanamoli, p. 497 n. 26). But why it must have "another function" or what this function would be is never explained. Nor is it explained why it is illogical!37 But he concludes: "So it is the heart-basis that remains to be recognized as their support" (ibid.)! The author certainly seems to have been eager to be faithful to Buddhaghosa, or perhaps trying to cover up, or-justify, an error! Now jTvitindriya, though in the 'materiality' domain, needs to be understood as a process like citta and not hadaya. jTvita, also a process, listed as a dhamma, both kusala 'moral' and akusala 'immoral'-and presumably avyakata 'indeterminate', too-and thus present in all the states of mind, would be its legitimate sibling in the mentality domain. Jlvita and jTvitindriya are, then, both coextensive with the whole body, and with each other.
Concluding Remarks
If our analysis is correct, then we must see the identification of the heart-base as the seat of consciousness during the post-Buddhian period as a gross misrepresentation of the Buddha, in violation of the Buddha's advice not to be led by "tradition" or "the authority of religious texts" (Kalama Sutta). The tradition here for the Sinhalese Poranacariyas appears to be Brahminism and the associated worldview, with the Vedas, Puranas, Agamas, and Upanisads collectively being the texts. For Buddhaghosa, Kassapa, and all others later, the Sinhalese Poranacariyas and their Atthakathas (see Adikaram 1946 for an overview) serve as tradition and text, respectively. What we then have, it appears, is an example of how the violation of a scholarly principle of objectivity, as called for by the Buddha, can blind an inquirer to the obvious. For after all, as we have seen, the reciprocal relationship between vinfinana and namarupa is no stranger to the Abhidhammikas, Poranacariyas, or Buddhaghosa, since it appears in their own analyses. Yet they slide over it as if it was irrelevant to the question at hand!38
While a comprehensive treatment of the epistemological and pragmatic implications of our new understanding is beyond the scope of this essay, we may suggest some productive lines of comparative inquiry. An obvious one would be our current scientific understanding of the nature of the mind. Writing in Psychology Today, John (1976) pointed out, for example, how the mind is extended throughout the body, through its neuroskeletal system. Chopra (1989), "exploring the frontiers of mindbody medicine" in his Quantum Healing, refers to a 'thinking body', positing the mind ('intelligence') in the whole body.39 Buddha's own understanding, of course, goes beyond John's neuroskeletal system to the very boundaries-skin, hair, nails, and teeth, included as part of the thirty-two body parts (supra). Putting the Buddha's understanding in terms of contemporary terminology, should we say that the mind is in every one of over several trillion cells in each one of us, residing in each DNA molecule and in instantaneous communication with every other DNA molecule, with research assigning this function of communication to 'neuropeptides' or "information molecules" (see note 39)? Since the blueprint for every subsequent DNA molecule is provided by the very first DNA molecule that comes into existence at the point of conception, before the embryo starts dividing up the second day or begins to make a nervous system on day eighteen (Chopra 1989) , it is obvious that the mind must then be in the very first DNA molecule as well. That is to say, it is precortical. Isn't this, then, what the Buddha says when he posits a reciprocal relationship between namarupa and vifnnana?
There is another related line of inquiry. In maintaining that the heart is not the seat of consciousness, the Buddha obviously joins contemporary medicine in rejecting cardiac arrest as constituting (clinical) death. Suwanda H. J. Sugunasiri But whether the current medical understanding that "brain death" constitutes death matches with the Buddha's understanding can only be determined through an examination of the concept of cuti-citta 'exit consciousness' and associated teachings. For a start, it may be noted that, as mentioned in this section, the mind exists from day (i.e., moment) one, eighteen days before the neuronal system evolves. Would it not then make sense to consider the theoretical possibility that consciousness (another term for mind) could still be present after 'brain death', for however brief a moment, even though we may not have instruments sophisticated enough to measure it?
On a more pragmatic level, one of the obvious concerns relates to organ transplantation (see Sugunasiri 1990 ). For example, if the seat of consciousness is not the heart, would it be easier for Tibetan Buddhists, for example, to emulate the Bodhisattva ideal of donating organs (Jatakas) without being troubled by their traditional understanding that a dead body should not be moved for seven days, since life continues in the heart for that long? This, however, is not to say that life does not indeed continue to exist in the whole body, "postcortically" as we have sug- 11 -Even if we were to understand the two threats here as clearly referring to the physical and the mental, respectively, the association made is evident.
12 -It is possible that this list was arrived at by the Buddha through personal observation of his own mindbody through meditation, and/or by reference to the Indian medical texts of the time. 17 -The apparent inconsistent usage by the Buddha need not mean that he was unsure of himself, given the extremely comprehensive ways in which he has explained complex phenomena (e.g., namarupa, paticcasamuppada). It may rather be that he used the concepts and terms that best befitted the task at hand, the type of listener (from the wise to the ignorant), the context (a congregation of his disciples vs. the battlefield, in which he advised kings), etc. In this connection, it is worthy to note, e.g., how we, too, in contemporary times, use terms such as mind, thought, and consciousness with both semantic overlap and mutual exclusivity.
-
18 -But see later in the third section below for another synonym used Philosophy East & West by the Buddha that is more relevant to the case being made. 39 -See Barasch 1993, pp. 58ff., for an update of the literature, which has now come to identify neuropeptides-"stars scattered through the bodily firmament" as he puts it, as the "information molecules."
